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INGRAHAM v. WRIGHT:' CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN
SCHOOLS PASSES CONSTITUTIONAL TESTS
INTRODUCTION
During the 1970-1971 school year, public schools in Dade County,
Florida used corporal punishment as a means of disciplining misbehaving
students. This disciplinary technique was utilized pursuant to Florida state
legislation 2 and a local school board policy regulation.3 In essence, the law
permitted teachers to paddle students after consultation with the principal,
and subject to a general prohibition against "degrading or unduly severe"
punishment. 4 The school board regulation provided additional guidelines to
regulate the use of this disciplinary sanction.5
1. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
2. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.27 (West 1961).
3. Dade County Board of Education Policy 5144. The text of the Policy is found
at note 5 infra.
4. In the 1970-71 school year, FLA. STAT. ANN. §232.27 (West 1961) provided:
Each teacher or other member of the staff of any school shall assume such
authority for the control of pupils as may be assigned to him by the principal
and shall keep good order in the classroom and in other places in which he is
assigned to be in charge of pupils, but he shall not inflict corporal punishment
before consulting the principal or teacher in charge of the school, and in no case
shall such punishment be degrading or unduly severe in this nature.
The Florida Legislature subsequently amended this statute. The amemdments became
effective on July 1, 1976:
"Subject to law and to the rules of the district school board, each teacher or
other member of the staff of any school shall have such authority for the
control and discipline of students as may be assigned to him by the principal or
his designated representative and shall keep good order in the classroom and in
other places in which he is assigned to be in charge of students. If a teacher feels
that corporal punishment is necessary, at least the following procedures shall be
followed:
"(1) The use of corporal punishment shall be approved in principle by the
principal before it is used, but approval is not necessary for each specific
instance in which it is used.
"(2) A teacher or principal may administer corporal punishment only in the
presence of another adult who is informed beforehand and in the student's pres-
ence, of the reason for the punishment.
"(3) A teacher or principal who has administered punishment shall, upon
request, provide the pupil's parent or guardian with a written explanation of the
reason for the punishment and the name of the other adult who was present."
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 232.27 (1977) (codifier's notation omitted). Corporal punishment
is now defined as "the moderate use of physical force or physical contact by a
teacher or principal as may be necessary to maintain discipline or to enforce
school rules." § 228.041(28). The local school boards are expressly authorized to
adopt rules governing student conduct and discipline and are directed to make
available codes of student conduct. § 230.23(6). Teachers and principals are given
immunity from civil and criminal liability for enforcing disciplinary rules,
"[e]xcept in the case of excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment ......
§ 232.275.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 655 n.6 (1977).
5. 430 U.S. at 656 n.7. Policy 5144 of the Dade County Board of Education
authorized the use of corporal punishment where other means of seeking cooperation
(594)
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On January 7, 1971, suit was filed in United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida by two junior high school students, James
Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews, alleging, individually and on behalf of
all Dade County students as a class,6 that the infliction of corporal
punishment at the Charles Drew Junior High School in Dade County,
Florida resulted in a deprivation of their constitutional rights under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988. 7 Evidence was presented at a week-long trial before the
district court. The testimony of sixteen students described rather harsh
incidents of corporal punishment at Drew Junior High School. James
Ingraham testified that he was forced over a table in the principal's office
and received twenty blows with a paddle because he was slow to respond to
a teacher's instructions.8 As a result, the boy lost eleven days of school and
suffered from a large hematoma which required medical attention. 9
Roosevelt Andrews testified that he was paddled several times for minor
infractions; on two occasions he was struck on his arms, once depriving him
of the full use of an arm for one week.10
The district court, acting on the assumption that all the testimony was
credible, issued a directed verdict in favor of the defendants," holding that
the punishment as authorized and practiced generally in the county schools
violated no constitutional right.12 The court observed that while corporal
punishment could, in some instances, violate the eighth amendment, on the
facts of this case a jury could not lawfully find "elements of severity,
arbitrary inflictions, unacceptability in terms of contemporary standards, or
from the student failed. The regulation specified that the principal should determine
the necessity for corporal discipline, that the student should understand the
seriousness of the offense and the reason for the punishment, and that the
punishment should be administered in the presence of another adult. The student
should not be paddled in an atmosphere which is likely to produce shame and ridicule.
The policy guidelines further cautioned against administering corporal punishment to
a child under psychological or medical treatment and warned the school personnel of
the possibility of personal liability if physical injuries resulted.
6. Counts one and two were individual damage actions by Ingraham and
Andrews based on paddling incidents that allegedly occurred in October, 1970 at
Drew Junior High School. Count three was a class action for declaratory and
injunctive relief on behalf of all students in the Dade County schools. The district
court certified the class under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and 23(c)(1) to include "[a]ll
students of the Dade County School system who are subject to the corporal
punishment policies issued by the Defendant, Dade County School Board ... ." See
430 U.S. at 654 n.2.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 (1970). Named as defendants in all counts were Willie J.
Wright, principal of the Drew Junior High School, Lemmie Deliford, an assistant
principal, Solomon Barnes, an assistant to the principal, and Edward L. Whigham,
superintendent of the Dade County school system. 430 U.S. at 653-54.
8. Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248, 256 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 525 F.2d 909
(5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), aff'd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 257. Several other students testified to receiving severe paddlings which
resulted in serious injuries, including broken bones, head wounds, and massive
hematomas. Id. at 255-59.
11. Ingraham v. Wright, No. 71-23 (S.D. Fla. 1973), rev'd, 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir.
1974), vacated, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), aff'd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
12. 430 U.S. at 658.
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gross disproportion which are necessary to bring 'punishment' to the
constitutional level of 'cruel and unusual punishment.' "13
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court decision and remanded the case for
a jury trial on the merits. 14 The two-judge majority found that corporal
punishment as practiced in Dade County, Florida, and particularly at the
Drew Junior High School, was so severe that it violated both the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. 5 Moreover, in the
court's view, the procedures in School Board Policy 5144 failed to satisfy the
requirements of the due process clause.'8 In a dissenting opinion, Judge
Lewis R. Morgan argued that there was no constitutional question involved
in the case at all and, therefore, that no rights had been violated. 7 He
contended that federal courts should not intervene in the internal
disciplinary practices of one school.18
Upon rehearing, the en banc court rejected the reasoning of the three-
judge panel and affirmed the district court's directed verdict.19 The court
concluded that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment is inapplicable to corporal punishment in public schools because
13. Id.
14. Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 525 F.2d 909 (5th
Cir. 1976) (en banc), affl'd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
15. Id. The appellate court considered the age of the individuals, the nature of the
misconduct, the risk of physical and psychological damage, and the availability of
alternative disciplinary measures. It concluded that the system of punishment at
Drew Junior High School was excessive and, therefore, that it violated the eighth
amendment's proscription against punishments which are greatly disproportionate to
the offense. Id. at 264. The court explained that although it was unwilling to say that
mild or moderate corporal punishment is unrelated to the achievement of any
legitimate educational purpose, the severe punishment meted out at Drew went
beyond legitimate bounds and, therefore, violated the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
269.
16. The majority outlined procedural guidelines which should be followed in the
use of corporal discipline in public schools. Included in the court's guidelines were the
following: (1) the student must "know and understand" the rule under which he is to
be punished; (2) the school authorities must tell him before he is punished precisely
what he has done which merits punishment; (3) if the student concedes that he has
engaged in certain conduct, but claims that he did not know that such conduct was
prohibited, school officials should proceed with caution, inquiring whether in fact the
student was ignorant of such school rules; (4) the school should publish written rules
of conduct to eliminate many problems which may arise; and (5) if the student claims
he is innocent of the alleged conduct, school authorities should make sufficient
inquiries to insure that the student is guilty beyond any reasonable doubt.
Eyewitnesses should be questioned by the principal or his designee, and the student
should be allowed to call witnesses on his own behalf. The student should also be
permitted to respond to the witnesses against him. In some cases, the court suggested
that the student should be accorded an opportunity to question opposing witnesses.
The court emphasized that the full panoply of procedures, such as found in a
courtroom, is not required and that the hearing described above could take place in an
informal setting. No formal rules of procedure or evidence need be followed. Id. at
267-68. For further discussion of the decision of the court of appeals, see 43 GEO.
WASH. L. Rxv. 1435 (1975); 12 Hous. L. REV. 500 (1975); 53 Tax. L. REV. 395 (1975).
17. 498 F.2d at 270-71 (Morgan, J., dissenting).
18. Id.




this constitutional guarantee only applies to punishment invoked as a
sanction for criminal conduct.20 Additionally, the majority observed that due
process under the fourteenth amendment does not unconditionally require
an opportunity to be heard.21 The claims in the instant case were not found
to be substantial enough in a constitutional sense to justify the time and
effort required to adhere to due process procedures in schools 2 2 or to warrant
federal court interference. 23 The court suggested the plaintiffs could pursue
the possibility of alternative remedies under state criminal or civil law.24
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the eighth
amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause applies to the infliction
of severe corporal discipline on public school children and whether the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment is violated when students are
subjected to such punishment without notice of the charges against them
and without an opportunity to be heard by a neutral person with authority
to decide whether corporal punishment is necessary.25 A five-justice majority
of the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Powell, affirmed the
20. Id. Distinguishing the case of Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968),
where the Eighth Circuit enjoined the use of a strap in prisons, the majority explained
that prisons and public schools are not analogous in the context of eighth amendment
coverage. Judge Morgan, speaking for the majority, emphasiked that the eighth
amendment was intended to prevent the imposition of unduly harsh penalties for
criminal conduct. It logically follows that discipline imposed upon persons incarcer-
ated for criminal conduct falls within its coverage, "since such discipline is part of the
total punishment to which the individual is being subjected for his crime." 525 F.2d at
914-15. To extend the Jackson case from the prison context to the school setting
would "distort the intended scope of the Amendment." Id. at 915.
21. See id. at 919.
22. The value of corporal punishment, the court contended, might be "severely
diluted" by an elaborate procedural process. Id. To require a published schedule of
infractions would serve to remove "a valid judgmental aspect from a decision which
should properly be left to the experienced administrator." Id. A hearing requirement
could undermine the effectiveness and utility of paddling, as administrators probably
have little time under present procedures to handle all the disciplinary problems
which beset them. Furthermore, a requirement that the relationship between parents,
students, and school officials be conducted in an adverse atmosphere in accordance
with the procedural rules of a court of law "'would hardly best serve the interest of
any of those involved."' Id. (quoting Whatley v. Pike County Bd. of Educ., No. 977
(N.D. Ga. 1971)).
23. Quoting Justice Fortas in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968), the
court observed that
"filudicial interposition in the operation of the public school systems of the
nation raises problems requiring care and restraint .... By and large, public
education in our nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.
Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in
the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply
implicate basic constitutional values."
525 F.2d at 919-20.
24. 525 F.2d at 915, 917. For further discussion of the en banc opinion of the court
of appeals, see Comment, Corporal Punishment: Forty Whacks with the Fourteenth
Amendment, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 869 (1976); 7 CUM. L. REv. 169 (1976); 45 U. CIN. L.
Rav. 500 (1976).
25. Ingraham v. Wright, 425 U.S. 990 (1976). The Supreme Court denied review of
the third question presented in the petition for certiorari - that is, whether the
infliction of severe corporal punishment upon public school students was arbitrary,
capricious, and unrelated to a legitimate educational purpose and, therefore, was a
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directed verdict entered by the district court and held that the students'
claim that corporal punishment violated both the eighth and fourteenth
amendments did not state a cause of action under either federal law or the
Constitution.26
This Comment will evaluate the Ingraham Court's analysis of the
eighth amendment and due process claims. The first part will outline the
Court's disposition of these issues. The Comment will then examine the
eighth amendment issue and suggest that a functional approach to eighth
amendment guarantees is more consonant with the history and function of
the Constitution than is the historical approach embraced by the Court.
Finally, the due process claim will be analyzed in terms of procedural
safeguards afforded by other recent Supreme Court cases. It will be
concluded that the availability of state remedies should have no place in an
evaluation of the need for procedural due process in the schools.
Before reaching the constitutional issues, the Court observed that
corporal punishment as a means of disciplining students dates back to the
colonial period27 and continues to play a role in the public education of
school children in most parts of the country. 28 Moreover, in a majority of
jurisdictions, school officials possess a qualified privilege to apply such force
as they reasonably believe is necessary for a child's proper control, training
violation of substantive due process under the fourteenth amendment. See Petitioner's
Brief for Certiorari at 2, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
The question whether corporal punishment in public schools violated either
the eighth or fourteenth amendments appeared ripe for review by the nation's highest
court. In addition to the uncertainty evidenced in the panel and en banc opinions in
the Ingraham case, there was substantial confusion in other courts as well. See Sims
v. Waln, 536 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1976) (imposition of corporal punishment is not a per se
violation of the eighth amendment, and the paddlings at the school in question were
not excessive; any due process guarantees which may be required were not infringed);
Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974) (excessive corporal punishment may
contravene the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause); Roberts v.
Way, 398 F. Supp. 856 (D. Vt. 1975) (excessive corporal punishment may violate the
eighth amendment); Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.) (corporal
punishment does not violate the eighth amendment; however, the school must accord
students minimal due process), aff'd mem. on other grounds, 423 U.S. 907 (1975);
Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366 (D. Vt. 1973); (corporal punishment as a civil
penalty violates neither the eighth nor the fourteenth amendment); Glaser v.
Marietta, 351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (school disciplinary rule, on its face, does
not violate the fourteenth amendment); Sims v. Board of Educ., 329 F. Supp. 678
(D.N.M. 1971) (school regulation authorizing corporal punishment does not violate
either the eighth or fourteenth amendment); Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex.
1971), aff'd per curiam, 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972)
(corporal punishment does not violate either the fourteenth or eighth amendment).
26. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
27. Id. at 660-61.
28. Id. See also E. BOLMEIER, THE SCHOOL IN THE LEGAL STRucTURE § 16.17, at
277 (2d ed. 1973); 43 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1485 (1975).
The Court, however, noted that professional and public opinion is divided on
the value of this disciplinary tactic. 430 U.S. at 660-61. See also Amicus Brief of
National Education Association; Amicus Brief of American Psychological Task Force
on the Rights of Children and Youth, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Buss,
Procedural Due Process For School Discipline: Probing The Constitutional Outline,
119 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 582 (1971).
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and education. 29 If this privilege is abused, remedies exist under state
criminal or civil law. 30
Analyzing the eighth amendment claim, the Court emphasized that the
application of the cruel and unusual punishment clause has traditionally
been limited to protecting those convicted of crimes.31 Refusing to be swayed
into departing from this well-established precedent, the Court held that the
"eighth amendment does not apply to the paddling of children as a means of
maintaining discipline in public schools. '32 In reaching this decision,
Justice Powell acknowledged that corporal discipline in prisons has been
abandoned. 33 However, in the majority's view a prisoner and a school child
are in vastly different situations, separated by the harsh facts of criminal
incarceration. 34 A prisoner is afforded eighth amendment protection because
he is susceptible to abusive treatment in the context of a penal system; a
student, however, attends an open institution which is scrutinized on a daily
basis by family members, friends, and the community.3 5
With regard to the petitioners' due process assertions, the Court
explained that determining the application of this constitutional guarantee
requires a two-stage analysis: first, the Court must ascertain whether the
asserted interests are encompassed within the fourteenth amendment's
29. 430 U.S. at 661-62. See also N. EDWARDS, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 610-15 (3d ed. 1971); 1 F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 3.20,
at 291-92 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 27, at 136-37 (4th
ed. 1971).
30. 430 U.S. at 661. See also N. EDWARDS, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
610-15 (3d ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150, Comments c-e (1965);
Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, 12 VAND. L. REv. 723, 734-39 (1959).
31. 430 U.S. at 664. Justice Powell reviewed the history surrounding the adoption
of the eighth amendment and concluded that the principal concern of the framers of
the Constitution was to outlaw torturous and abusive criminal punishments. Id. at
664-66. Moreover, Justice Powell stated that the Court's prior applications of this
amendment had all dealt with criminal punishments. Id. at 666-67. See Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (incarceration without medical care); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976) (execution for murder); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
(execution for murder); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) ($20 fine for public
drunkenness); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (incarceration as a criminal
for addiction to narcotics); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion)
(expatriation for desertion); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)
(execution by electrocution after a failed first attempt); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (1910) (15 years imprisonment and other penalties for falsifying an official
document; Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903) (10 years imprisonment for
conspiracy to defraud); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (execution by electrocu-
tion); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (execution by firing squad); Pervear v.
Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475 (1867) (fine and imprisonment at hard labor for
bootlegging).
Justice Powell emphasized that in those few instances where the Court was
confronted with claims that sought to apply the eighth amendment to situations
outside the criminal process, the Court had no difficulty in concluding that the
amendment was inapplicable, 430 U.S. at 667-68. See, e.g., Uphaus v. Wyman, 360
U.S. 72 (1959) (a judgment of civil contempt resulting in incarceration pending
compliance with a subpoena); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698' (1893)
(deportation of aliens).
32. 430 U.S. at 664.
33. Id. at 660. See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579-80 (8th Cir. 1968).
34. 430 U.S. at 668-69.
35. Id. at 669-71.
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protection of "life, liberty or property" and, second, if such interests are
protected, the Court must decide what procedures are necessary to assure
"due process of law. '3 6 Applying this analysis, the Court concluded that a
constitutionally protected liberty interest is implicated whenever school
authorities, acting under color of state law, deliberately punish a child for
misconduct by restraining the student and by inflicting on him an
appreciable degree of physical pain.37 The Court held, however, that
additional procedural safeguards were unnecessary because the traditional
common law remedies for abusive corporal punishment are fully adequate to
afford the requisite due process. 38
In determining what process is due the Ingraham Court analyzed three
distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedures; and, finally, the state interest involved and the
burden on the state that additional or substitute procedures would entail.3 9
In analyzing the private interest involved in avoiding corporal punishment,
the Court noted that in accordance with a long-standing accommodation
between the child's interest in his personal security and the traditional
common law privilege to discipline students, no deprivation of substantive
rights can occur where the corporal punishment remains within the limits of
that privilege.40
The Court acknowledged, however, that even punishment protected by
the privilege must be inflicted in accordance with procedural safeguards
that minimize the risk of wrongful punishment and provide for the fair
resolution of disputed questions of justification.41 Therefore, Justice Powell
reviewed the corporal discipline practiced in the Dade County schools to
determine the risk of an erroneous deprivation under those procedures and
the value of requiring additional or substitute procedural safeguards. 42 The
Ingraham Court concluded that in this case the students' due process
interests were already protected by adequate safeguards 43 and that most
36. Id. at 672 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-72 (1972);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
37. Id. at 672-74. The opinion emphasized that "liberty" under the due process
clause includes the right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified
intrusion of personal security. Id. at 673. For an analysis of the original interpretation
of this constitutional right, see Shattuck, The True Meaning Of The Term "Liberty"
In Those Clauses In The Federal And State Constitutions Which Protect "Life,
Liberty And Property," 4 HARv. L. REv. 365 (1891).
38. 430 U.S. at 672.
39. Id. at 675. This three-prong approach was first articulated by the Court in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 167-68 (1974); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-66 (1970); Cafeteria and
Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
40. 430 U.S. at 675-76.
41. Id. at 676.
42. Id. at 676-80.
43. Id. at 676-82. The Court emphasized that the statute requires the teacher and
principal to decide whether corporal punishment is reasonably necessary under the
circumstances and to exercise the sanction with prudence and restraint. Id. at 677. If
the punishment is excessive, school authorities may be liable for damages; if malice is
shown, they may be subject to criminal penalties. Id. See note 2 supra.
[VOL. 37
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cases of corporal discipline at the Drew school were not excessive.44
Moreover, in those instances where severe punishment had occurred, the
student remained free to seek a remedy in state court under the available
civil and criminal laws.4 5 In this setting, the Court found that procedural
safeguards prior to intrusions on a child's personal security were neither
constitutionally mandated nor necessary. 46
Turning to the state interest involved, Justice Powell agreed with school
officials that it would be impracticable to formulate a rule of procedural due
process that varies with the particular discipline to be imposed. Thus, if
affording a student a prior hearing were required at all, it would need to
precede any paddling, however moderate or trivial. 47 On this basis, the
majority rejected the students' request for notice and hearing, reasoning
that such a requirement would significantly intrude into the educational
responsibility that lies with public school authorities and would require a
diversion of educational resources. Moreover, the Court was concerned that
mandatory prior notice and hearing may lead school authorities to abandon
corporal punishment altogether rather than to incur the burdens of
complying with such procedural requirements. 48
Justice White, in an opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens, dissented from the Court's eighth amendment and procedural due
process holdings. He reminded the Court that the eighth amendment reflects
a societal judgment that some punishments are so barbaric and inhumane
that they may not be imposed constitutionally on anyone, regardless of how
44. See 430 U.S. at 477-78.
45. Id. at 678.
46. Id. at 678-80. The Court analogized the claim for advance procedural
safeguards in public school corporal punishment cases to warrantless probable cause
public arrests under the fourth amendment. In the latter instance, despite the risk
that the police may act unreasonably in arresting a suspect, the traditional common
law rule permitting such arrests without an advance determination of the facts has
been reaffirmed by the Court in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
Although an advance determination of probable cause by a magistrate would be
desirable, the Court refused to transform this judicial preference into a constitutional
rule, particularly where the nation has traditionally authorized warrantless probable
cause arrests. Similarly Justice Powell concluded that in corporal punishment
situations there is no reason to depart from tradition and require an advance
determination of the facts. 430 U.S. at 679-80.
47. See id. at 680.
48. Id. at 680-82. The Court balanced the rights of the students with the needs of
school authorities. Thus, upon finding "the low incidence of abuse, the openness of
our schools, and the common law safeguards that already exist," the Court concluded
that the risk of error that may result in a deprivation of a student's constitutional
rights could "only be regarded as minimal." Id. at 682. The public schools, on the
other hand, need flexibility in disciplining misbehaving students. Quoting from its
opinion in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975), the Court explained that" '[elvents
calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate,
effective action.'" 430 U.S. at 681 (footnote omitted). The Court has continually
recognized the "need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of
school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe
and control conduct in the schools." Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
507 (1969). See also note 160 infra.
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opprobrious the underlying offense. 49 In the dissent's view, similar
punishments logically may not be imposed on persons for less culpable acts,
such as breaches of school discipline: "if it is constitutionally impermissible
to cut off someone's ear for the commission of a murder, it must be
unconstitutional to cut off a child's ear for being late to class." ° Because the
eighth amendment contains no language which limits its application solely
to a criminal context, Justice White reasoned that the relevant inquiry
should be whether the purpose of the deprivation is among those ordinarily
associated with punishment - such as retribution, rehabilitation, or
deterrence - rather than whether the offense for which the punishment is
inflicted has been labeled criminal.51 Furthermore, the dissent regarded the
majority's observation that aggrieved students could resort to state remedies
as irrelevant to a determination of the scope of eighth amendment
protection.5 2
With respect to the due process issue, Justice White noted that the
purpose of due process in this context is to protect the student from those
punishments that the state would not have inflicted had it found the facts in
a more reliable way.5 3 The dissent observed that the promotion of reliable
factfinding underlay the Court's decision in Goss v. Lopez5 4 to require that a
student be given an opportunity to be heard prior to suspension from
school.55 Justice White perceived no constitutional difference between the
need for reliable factfinding in cases of suspension and cases of corporal
punishment: both involve important liberty or property rights which must
49. 430 U.S. at 684 (White, J., dissenting). See Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 841 & n.10
(1969). See also notes 62 to 66 and accompanying text infra.
50. 430 U.S. at 684 (White, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 686-88 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958)). The dissent
asserted that no one can deny that the spanking of a school child is "punishment."
Justice White argued:
Like other forms of punishment, spanking of school children involves an
institutionalized response to the violation of some official rule or regulation
proscribing certain conduct and is imposed for the purpose of rehabilitating the
offender, deterring the offender and others like him from committing the
violation in the future, and inflicting some measure of social retribution for the
harm that has been done.
Id. at 685-86.
52. Id. at 690-91. "Even assuming that the remedies available to public school
students are adequate under Florida law, the availability of state remedies has never
been determinative of the coverage or of the protections afforded by the Eighth
Amendment." Id. at 690 (footnote omitted). The dissent noted that the majority's
argument was implicitly rejected by the Court in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107
(1976), where it was held that the failure to provide for the medical needs of prisoners
could constitute cruel and unusual punishment even though a medical malpractice
remedy in tort was available to the prisoners under the state tort law. 430 U.S. at 691.
53. Id. at 692 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 344 (1976)).
54. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
55. The Goss Court, explaining the need for an informal hearing, said:
Disciplinarians, although proceeding in utmost good faith, frequently act on the
reports and advice of others; and the controlling facts and the nature of the
conduct under challenge are often disputed. The risk of error is not at all trivial,
and it should be guarded against if that may be done without prohibitive cost or
interference with the educational process.
419 U.S. at 580.
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be protected from arbitrary or mistaken deprivation.56 While acknowledging
that some burden would be placed on school disciplinary procedures if the
"rudimentary precautions" established in Goss were required in corporal
punishment situations, 57 the dissent argued that those costs would be no
greater whether the student is paddled or suspended; in either case the risk
of wrongful punishment is no smaller while the danger of a significant
intrusion into the disciplinary process is just- as great.58
Finally, the dissent contended that there is no basis, either in logic or
authority, for the majority's assumption that the right to commence an
action in state court to recover damages for excessive corporal punishment
affords substantially greater protection than the informal conference
mandated in Goss. 9 In the dissent's view, the right to bring an action in tort
would be "utterly inadequate" to protect a student from erroneously inflicted
corporal punishment for two reasons. First, under Florida law, a student
who was punished for an act he did not commit cannot recover from a
teacher who had proceeded in utmost good faith and had relied on the
reports and advice of others.6° Second, a tort action would be inadequate for
the simple reason that it comes too late; a lawsuit necessarily occurs after
the punishment is imposed, while the infliction of pain remains final and
irreparable.6 1
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
In order to prevent the use of torturous and barbarous methods of
criminal punishment employed by some European countries,6 2 the framers
56. See 430 U.S. at 692-93.
57. See id. at 700.
58. Id. (citing the majority opinion, 430 U.S. at 681-82). See Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 585 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
59. 430 U.S. at 699 (citing the majority opinion, 430 U.S. at 678 n.46).
60. Id. at 693-94. Justice White emphasized that
the student has no remedy at all for punishment imposed on the basis of
mistaken facts, at least as long as the punishment was reasonable from the point
of view of the disciplinarian, uninformed by any prior hearing. The "traditional
common law remedies" on which the majority relies ... thus do nothing to
protect the student from the danger that concerned the Court in Goss - the risk
of reasonable, good faith mistake in the school disciplinary process.
Id. at 694-95 (footnote omitted).
The defense of "good faith mistake" has been traditionally recognized in most
jurisdictions. See note 30 supra.
61. 430 U.S. at 695.
62. At a meeting of the Virginia delegation called to consider the United States
Constitution, Patrick Henry voiced strong objection to the lack of a prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishments. The delegate from Virginia remarked:
Congress, from their general powers, may fully go into business of human
legislation. They may legislate, in criminal cases, from treason to the lowest
offense - petty larceny. They may define crimes and prescribe punishment....
But when we come to punishments, no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence
put on the virtue of representatives ....
In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose the
restriction of not imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and
inflicting cruel unusual punishments. These are prohibited by your declaration of
rights. What has distinguished our ancestors? - That they would not admit of
tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But Congress may introduce the
practice of the civil law, in preference to the common law. They may introduce
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of the Constitution drafted the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual
punishment clause.63 Patterned after the English Bill of Rights of 168964 and
the Virginia Declaration of Rights,65 the prohibition was originally intended
to apply to punishments imposed as sanctions for criminal conduct.66
Relying on the amendment's historical genesis, the Ingraham Court refused
to extend the eighth amendment's protection to punishments inflicted in a
civil context - for violations of public school rules and regulations.67 The
Court's analysis, however, fails to articulate an adequate justification for
this distinction.
The language of the eighth amendment does not specify that it
comprehends only criminally-related punishments. 6  Although the
application of this constitutional protection has not been confined
solely to punishments inflicted for violations of criminal statutes,
prior cases nevertheless tended to limit its application to criminal or
quasi-criminal situations. 69 For example, in the companion cases of Perez v.
the practice of France, Spain, and Germany - of torturing, to extort a confession
of the crime. They will say that they might as well draw examples from those
countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell you that there is such a
necessity of strengthening the arm of government, by torture, in order to punish
with still more relentless severity. We are then lost and undone.
3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 447-48 (2d ed. 1881). See generally Granucci, "Nor
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv.
839 (1969).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
64. "That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." English Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M., c. 2,§ 10.
65. On June 12, 1776 the Virginia convention adopted a Declaration of Rights
drafted by George Mason, Fairfax County delegate. Section 9 of the Declaration
mirrored the protections of the English Bill of Rights of 1689. Following its inclusion
in the Virginia Constitution, eight other states adopted the clause, the federal
government placed it into the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, and it was added to the
United States Constitution in 1791 as the eighth amendment. Granucci, "Nor Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 840
(1969) (citing R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791 (1955)).
66. "[Congress will] have to ascertain, point out, and determine what kinds of
punishments shall be inflicted on those convicted of crimes. They are nowhere
restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard of punishments and annexing
them to crime. . . ." 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111 (2d ed. 1881) (emphasis added).
67. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
68. See note 63 supra. See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 685 (1977)
(White, J., dissenting).
69. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference to
medical needs of prisoners by prison officials); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (loss
of nationality due to desertion from the army); Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (corporal punishment in state correctional
school of which one-third of the students were non-criminal offenders, with no
distinction drawn between criminal and non-criminal students); Knecht v. Gillman,
488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973) (injection of vomit-inducing drugs as part of aversion
therapy used on mentally ill inmates); Wheeler v. Glass, 473 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973)
(disciplinary techniques in state hospital for retarded children); Vann v. Scott, 467
F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972) (runaway children confined to state corrective institutions);
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (whipping prisoners to maintain
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BrowneU7 and Trop v. Dulles,71 the Court considered the punishment of
denationalization. The Court held that such a punishment was constitu-
tionally permissible in Perez because it was inflicted as a sanction for the
civilly-precluded act of voting in a foreign election. However, in Trop, this
punishment was considered cruel and unusual because it was imposed for
the criminall-precluded act of desertion. In either decision, however, were
the situations explicitly distinguished on the ground that the eighth
amendment is limited to the criminal context. 72 Nonetheless, prior to the
Ingraham decision, the federal judiciary had demonstrated both a reluc-
tance to extend the eighth amendment to punishments for civil violations 73
and confusion over whether such an interpretation would be constitutionally
proper. The Ingraham Court, in concluding that the protection of this
constitutional guarantee is available only where there is a criminal nexus,74
may have finally resolved the debate.7 5
As early as the 1910 decision in Weems v. United States,76 the Supreme
Court acknowledged that the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishments "must be capable of wider application than the mischief which
discipline); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affieck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I.
1972) (confinement to isolation cells in boys training school). A common characteristic
which runs through each of these cases is that they arise in the criminal or quasi-
criminal context (i.e., punishment for criminal acts or treatment of prisoners and
other involuntarily institutionalized persons). See also note 93 and accompanying text
infra.
70. 356 U.S. 44 (1958), overruled, Affroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
71. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (Warren, C.J.) (plurality opinion).
72. The Trop Court, emphasizing that there existed a "vital difference between
the two statutes that purport to implement these powers decreeing loss of citizenship,"
id. at 93 (Warren, C.J.), noted that the Trop statute authorized the sanction for those
found guilty of the crime of desertion. In contrast, the statute in Perez permitted
denationalization to resolve possible international problems which may result when
one votes in a foreign election. It must be noted, however, that in neither decision are
the cases explicitly distinguished on the ground that the eighth amendment was
inapplicable in Perez because the wrong committed violated a civil statute, while the
constitutional protection was afforded in Trop because the defendant's actions fell
within a criminal context. This conclusion can only be inferred. See Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 687 n.3 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
73. See, e.g., Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 81-82 (1959) (civil contempt for
refusal to comply with a subpoena to produce documents); Donaldson v. Read
Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178 (1948) (Postmaster General's order preventing publisher
from receiving mail and cashing postal money orders due to belief that publisher was
using the mails to defraud); Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 United States 698 (1893)
(deportation of alien); United States v. Stangland, 242 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1957) (fine for
violation of a civil regulatory statute).
74. 430 U.S. at 666-68.
75. There had been language in several of the earlier cases which limited
application of the eighth amendment to the criminal context. In Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514 (1968), the Court said: "The primary purpose of [the eighth amendment] has
always been considered, and properly so, to be directed at the method or kind of
punishment imposed for the violation of criminal statutes .... ." Id. at 531-32
(emphasis added). See also Negrich v. Hohn, 246 F. Supp. 173, 176 (W.D. Pa. 1965),
aff'd, 379 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1967). The Ingraham decision, however, appears to be the
first time the Supreme Court explicitly limited the scope of this amendment by
applying the criminal/civil distinction.
76. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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gave it birth" if it is to remain vital.77 The Weems Court reasoned that
"[t]ime works changes, brings into existence new conditions and pur-
poses,"7 and, hence, that the basic guarantees contained in the Bill of
Rights must grow and change with the times.79 Consequently, rather than
adhering to the rigid view that the eighth amendment applies only to
punishments originally contemplated by the drafters, it would be more
appropriate to look to the spirit of the original intent and, following the
guidelines enunciated in Weems,80 to extend the amendment's protection to
new situations analogous to those that motivated the amendment's
adoption.
The need for a flexible approach to the cruel and unusual punishment
clause is understood by the fact that, at the time the eighth amendment was
adopted, the concept of a free compulsory public school system, although
contemplated by a few of the founding fathers, was far from a reality.81 This
system of education did not arise in the United States until the mid-1800's.82
The present expansive system of compulsory education, characterized by the
Supreme Court as "perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments,"83 was unknown to the Constitution's framers. Punishments
inflicted in this particular institutional setting, therefore, cannot be said to
fall strictly within the original understanding of the eighth amendment. 84
77. Id. at 373.
78. Id.
79. The Weems Court, after tracing the legislative history of the eighth
amendment, explained that the general language of legislation, both statutory and
constitutional, should not be confined to the form that the evil had originally taken:
[Constitutions] are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing
occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to
approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it." The
future is their care and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which
no prophecy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our
contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be. Under any
other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be
deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value and
be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in
words might be lost in reality.. . . The meaning and vitality of the Constitution
have developed against narrow and restrictive construction.
Id.
Thus, the Weems Court permitted the extension of the eighth amendment to a
punishment (fine and imprisonment at hard and painful labor for twelve years) which
had not been a punishment originally contemplated by the framers to be cruel and
unusual.
80. See notes 76 to 79 and accompanying text supra.
81. Several framers of the Constitution believed in the necessity of public
education. In 1779, a plan to educate school children at public cost for three years and
a few gifted boys beyond that was presented by Thomas Jefferson to the Virginia
Legislature. This proposal was rejected. Forty years later Jefferson offered another
plan for public schools, but this was again voted down. See 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA MACROPAEDIA 365-66 (15th ed. 1974).
82. Id. at 365-67.
83. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 213 (1972). See also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). See generally Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
84. While corporal punishment may have been a very common practice at the
time of the founding fathers in private schools, a distinction must be drawn between
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A criterion for determining the scope of the eighth amendment that is
more congruous with the concerns that motivated its adoption would be
whether the sanction imposed on the individual is "punishment."8 5 This
approach would clearly adhere to the language of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause while remaining consistent with the modern evolving
standard enunciated by the Weems Court and necessitated by changes in
American society since the amendment's adoption.8 6 The Supreme Court
and a number of lower federal courts have, on occasion, extended the
protection of the eighth amendment to punishments in noncriminal
situations.8 7 The treatment accorded prisoners,88 retarded children and
mental patients,8 9 runaway children,90 criminal and noncriminal juveniles
attending state correctional institutions, 91 and army deserters92 has been
scrutinized to determine whether it comports with the requirements of the
cruel and unusual punishment clause. Although the sanctions imposed in
these instances were "civil," in that they were not imposed for violations of
penal statutes, the courts, nevertheless, have held the eighth amendment
implicated. It is significant that the purpose of the deprivation in each of
these situations was among those ordinarily associated with punishment,
such as retribution, rehabilitation or deterrence. 93
Similarly, corporal punishment imposed on a public school student is
"punishment" in that it serves as retribution for the student's misconduct
and is intended to rehabilitate the individual while deterring other students
private and state action since the due process clause is applicable only in the latter
instance.
85. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), the Supreme Court explained that the
legislative classification of a statute as penal or non-penal is not conclusive in
determining whether there has been a violation of the eighth amendment. "[Elven a
clear legislative classification of a statute as 'non-penal' would not alter the
fundamental nature of a plainly penal statute .... If the statute imposes a disability
for the purposes of punishment - that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others,
etc. - it has been considered penal," and the eighth amendment would apply. Id. at
95-96 (footnotes omitted). Consequently, as the dissent in Ingraham notes, "[t]he
relevant inquiry is not whether the offense for which a punishment is inflicted has
been labeled criminal, but whether the purpose of the deprivation is among those
ordinarily associated with punishment, such as retribution, rehabilitation, or
deterrence." 430 U.S. at 686-87 (footnote omitted). See Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d
1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 1973); Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1972).
86. See notes 76 to 79 and accompanying text supra.
87. See cases cited in note 69 supra & notes 88 to 92 infra.
88. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.
1968).
89. Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973); Wheeler v. Glass, 473 F.2d
983 (7th Cir. 1973).
90. Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972).
91. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974);
Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
92. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
93. gee, e.g., Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354
(D.R.I. 1972), where the federal district court for Rhode Island applied the cruel and
unusual punishment clause to a situation involving school-aged juveniles confined to
a state correctional school. "The fact that juveniles are in theory not punished but
merely confined for rehabilitative purposes, does not preclude operation of the Eighth
Amendment," the court explained. "The reality of confinement in Annex B is that it is
punishment." Id. at 1366 (emphasis in original).
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from committing the same or similar violations of school rules and
regulations. Although the punishment is inflicted in the institutionalized
setting of a public school rather than a prison, a hospital or state training
school, it is no less punishment and no less state action.94 By attempting to
distinguish the cases according to either a criminal/civil formula or the
"extent of compulsory confinement," the Ingraham Court placed labels on
constitutional guarantees that defy rather than promote logical reasoning. 95
The Court offers no explanation why either the "civil" label or the
"openness" of the institution that imposes the sanction should preclude
eighth amendment application to punishments that are functionally
identical to those imposed for criminal violations or for prisoner misbehav-
ior.
Finally, the fact that corporal punishment traditionally has been used to
discipline students does not free it from eighth amendment scrutiny. The
Court has consistently held that the eighth amendment applies to the states
through the fourteenth amendment,96 that students are protected by the due
process clause,97 and that these constitutional rights are not shed at the
schoolhouse door.98 The Supreme Court has therefore recognized that
94. The majority's attempt to distinguish schools and prisons, see 430 U.S. at
668-71, 669 n.37, is unconvicing. Both students and individuals confined to prisons,
mental hospitals and juvenile training schools are involuntarily placed in some form
of institution. The fact that schools are "open institutions" subject to constant public
scrutiny, id. at 670, should not, of itself, take schools out of the reach of the eighth
amendment. Abuses can and do occur in such settings, as the facts of the Ingraham
case reveal. See notes 9 & 10 supra. When punishment in public schools falls within
the sphere of the "cruel and unusual," the courts, with the full remedies of the eighth
amendment, should intervene because, as the dissent notes, "if a punishment is so
barbaric and inhumane that it goes beyond the tolerance of a civilized society, its
openness to public scrutiny should have nothing to do with its constitutional
validity." 430 U.S. at 690 (White, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, merely because prisons, unlike public schools, have abandoned
the use of whippings and other types of beatings does not make corporal punishment
permissible under the eighth amendment in the latter instance and unconstitutional
in the former, as the Court seems to believe. It is conceivable that prisons have
abandoned the use of corporal discipline mainly because of the adverse court
decisions against its use in the prison environment. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404
F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (use of
the strap in prisons, if excessive, held to constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
See generally 60 AM. JUR. 2d Penal and Correctional Institutions § 43 (1972); Wheeler,
Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amend-
ment, 84 HARv. L. REv. 456 (1970); 24 STAN. L. REv. 838 (1972). See also Holt v.
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
95. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), the government argued that the statute
authorizing the sanction of denationalization for the crime of desertion was not
"penal" and, therefore, the eighth amendment did not apply. Refusing to accept this
contention, Chief Justice Warren countered: "How simple would be the tasks of
constitutional adjudication and of law generally if specific problems could be solved
by inspection of the labels pasted on them!" Id. at 94. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
27-33 (1967); Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 1973) (citing Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)); Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235, 1240-41 (7th Cir. 1972).
96. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
97. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943). See also note 121 and accompanying text infra.
98. See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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constitutional guarantees place limits on school officials' authority over
school children. 99
In the recent decision of Gregg v. Georgia,100 the Court embraced the
language of earlier cases and held that the eighth amendment bars not only
those punishments that are "barbaric," but also those that are "exces-
sive."10' Under the Gregg test a punishment is unconstitutionally "exces-
sive" if it (1) involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain; 102 or
(2) is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense. 0 3 Furthermore,
under Gregg, in determining whether the punishment is "excessive," the
Court should be guided by objective indicia that reflect the public attitude
toward a particular sanction.
0 4
Excessive corporal punishment could well be found to fall within these
concepts of "excessive" punishment. The facts of the Ingraham case reveal
numerous instances of what could be considered extreme and unnecessary
inflictions of pain. 05 Beating a child so severely that he required
hospitalization, merely because the student, in protesting his innocence,
refused to submit to the punishment, may be adjudged a punishment which
is highly disproportionate to the offense. 06
There is a current debate as to whether corporal punishment in the
public school setting is repugnant to standards of contemporary society.
Presently, only two states expressly prohibit this form of discipline, while
twenty-three states permit it by negative implication, and ten states
expressly permit its use. 0 7 Nevertheless, while practitioners, scholars,
legislators, the courts and the general public may disagree on whether
corporal punishment, per se, is a proper disciplinary technique, it is doubtful
99. Id. at 511. See also note 29 and accompanying text supra; note 129 and
accompanying text infra.
100. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
101. Id. at 171-73 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)). See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1977).
102. 428 U.S. at 173 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392-93 (1972) (Burger,
C.J.. dissenting); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349. 381 (1910): Wilkerson v. Utah,
99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879)). See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1977).
103. 428 U.S. at 173 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality
opinion) (dictum); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)). In Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the Court applied this factor and concluded that a
sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime
of rape. It is therefore forbidden by the eighth amendment. Id. at 592 & n.4.
104. 428 U.S. at 173 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962);
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968); and quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (the eighth amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society")). See also Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-97 (1977).
105. See notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text supra.
106. See Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248, 258-59 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 525
F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), affl'd, 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977).
107. See Brief for Petitioners at 31-32, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
For a sampling of varying scholarly opinions on the effectiveness and value of
corporal discipline, see sources cited in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660-61 n.17




that society would condone the excessive and abusive beating of school
children at issue in the Ingraham case.
Cruel and unusual punishment has been found with respect to the death
penalty,10 8 penal incarceration for drug addiction, 10 9 civil commitment for
status without treatment,110 strip cells and solitary confinements,"' the use
of tranquilizing drugs on juveniles a. state training schools, 1 2 corporal
punishment of prisoners and juveniles at state training schools," 3 and
denationalization of army deserters.1' 4 Consistent with the Constitution,
excessive corporal punishment as experienced in the Drew Junior High
School could be adjudged to fall within this group of prohibited punish-
ments.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The purpose of the due process clause is to protect individuals from
unjustified impairments of constitutionally recognized rights." 5 In deter-
mining whether due process requirements apply, a court must initially
analyze the nature of the interest at stake. In Board of Regents v. Roth,116
the Supreme Court explained that the concept of "liberty" should be given a
rather broad construction.' 1 7 Liberty has always included the concept that
one should be free from unjustified intrusions on personal security, 1 8
including freedom from bodily restraint and punishment. 19 The Ingraham
Court, recognizing this principle, acknowledged that the infliction of
corporal punishment on students by public school authorities implicates
fourteenth amendment liberty interests. 2° In determining what, if any,
108. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
109. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
110. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967); New York Ass'n for Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
111. LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878
(1973); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th
Cir. 1974); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 644-48 (E.D. Va. 1971).
112. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
113. Id. at 354-57; Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
114. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
115. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-74 (1977). See generally Shattuck,
The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" In Those Clauses In The Federal And State
Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, And Property," 4 HARV. L. REv. 365(1891). The applicable portion of the fourteenth amendment reads as follows: "nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
116. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
117. See id. at 571. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954). The Roth Court cautioned, however, that the
"range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite." 408 U.S. at
570. See also id. at 572.
118. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.41 (1977).
119. See, e.g., id. at 672 n.42 (citing cases). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
120. "'[W]here school authorities, acting under color of state law, deliberately
decide to punish a child ... and inflict appreciable physical pain, we hold that
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests are implicated." 430 U.S. at 674 (footnote
omitted). The majority, however, found no property rights impaired by this form of
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process was due these public school children the Court applied the three-
pronged test of Mathews v. Eldridge.121 The majority concluded that
although the students had a substantial interest in being free from
unnecessary inflictions of corporal punishment, state civil and criminal law
provided adequate protection, and any additional or substitute procedures
would be unduly burdensome on school authorities in their administration of
discipline. 12
2
The Ingraham Court observed that the determination of what process is
due requires a balancing of competing interests. 123 Accordingly, a student's
right to be free from unwarranted bodily intrusion must be measured
against the public school's interest in disciplining misbehaving students
without unnecessary judicial interference. 124 The Supreme Court has
recognized that state and local authorities have a strong interest in the
independent operation of the public school system,125 and the Court has
avoided intervention into internal school affairs unless constitutional
school discipline. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Court found that a
property right was involved when students were suspended from school. The Court
explained that the loss of the benefit of education for a period of time amounted to a
denial of property. Id. at 572-76. Petitioners in Ingraham similarly argued that
infliction of excessive corporal punishment could result in the loss of schooling since
the injuries sustained may require the student to be absent from school while
recovering. See Brief for Petitioners at 42-48, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
In rejecting this argument the Supreme Court explained that although corporal
punishment may, in rare instances, unintentionally result in a child being absent
from school temporarily, the nature of the practice itself, unlike suspension, does not
deprive students of property. 430 U.S. at 674 n.43.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that corporal punishment may be a far more
severe deprivation than suspension in certain situations. The paddled child may
sustain serious physical and psychological injuries and may also be caused to miss an
appreciable number of school days as a result of these injuries. In contrast, the scars
that may be left on a student who has been suspended are significantly less. See Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 588-89 (1975). Nevertheless, as the Court held in San Antonio
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the right to education is not a
"fundamental" property right.
121. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the Court explained that
[The analysis] requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interest that will be affected... ; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest . . . and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and, finally, the [state] interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
122. 430 U.S. at 674-82.
123. Id. at 675 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge. 424 U.S. 319. 335 (1976)). See
generally Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 572 (1974); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 167-71 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-95 (1969);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-29 (1905).
124. See 430 U.S. at 674-82.
125. See note 23 supra. See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975); Tinker v.
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). For an explanation of the in loco
parentis role of the schools see Commentary, Democracy In The Classroom: Due
Process And School Discipline, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 705, 706 (1975).
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considerations compelled such action. 126 In Goss v. Lopez,127 the Court noted
this concern, 128 but nevertheless held that where internal school disciplinary
methods conflict with constitutional rights and the deprivation of constitu-
tional interests is more than de minimus, the judiciary has the duty to step
in.129 Consequently, the Goss Court required that school authorities provide
at least informal procedural safeguards prior to suspending a student from
school.13o
In determining whether similar informal procedural safeguards were
necessary prior to the infliction of corporal punishment on a school child,
the Ingraham Court noted that alternative avenues of redress for abusive
corporal discipline presently exist under state criminal and civil law.13'
Justice Powell concluded that the availability of such sanctions afford
significant protection against unjustified corporal punishment because
teachers and school authorities are unlikely to inflict unnecessary or
excessive punishment when a possible consequence of doing so is the
institution of a civil or criminal proceeding against them. 32 Furthermore, in
the majority's view, a child subjected to an unjust beating may be
adequately compensated by bringing such an action in state court. 33
Accordingly, the Ingraham Court held that neither additional nor substitute
procedural safeguards were constitutionally required prior to the infliction of
corporal punishment on public school students.134 The Goss decision was
126. Concluding that a state may not compel a student to salute the flag, Justice
Jackson, speaking for the Court in West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943), explained:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its creatures - Boards of Education not
excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary
functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of
Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not
to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes.
Id. at 637. See also Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); note 120 and accompanying text supra.
127. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
128. Id. at 578.
129. "The authority possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce standards of
conduct in its schools although concededly very broad, must be exercised consistently
with constitutional safeguards."
130. "At the very minimum," the Goss Court explained, "students facing
suspension and consequent interference with a protected property interest must be
given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing." 419 U.S. at 579
(emphasis in original). For strong and consistent recognition of this principle, see also
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223,
233 (1863).
131. See 430 U.S. at 661, 676-78. See also note 30 and accompanying text supra.
But see note 29 and accompanying text supra.
132. 430 U.S. at 678.
133. Id. at 676 n.45.
134. Id. at 678-80.
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distinguished on the ground that no similar state court remedies existed to
protect a student who was unjustly suspended from school. 135
The availability of criminal or civil remedies in state court inadequately
protects the student's liberty interest for several reasons. First, the majority
indicated no authority for their conclusion that the existence of state
sanctions actually deters school authorities from inflicting unnecessary or
excessive corporal punishment. Furthermore, under a well-established
common law privilege, a teacher acting in good faith may be immune from
suit.136 Thus, a student who has been mistakenly punished may have no
remedy at all if the punishment was reasonable from the disciplinarian's
point of view.137 The case of North American Cold Storage Company v.
Chicago, 38 provides an interesting contrast. In that case, the Court held
that notice and a hearing were not necessary prior to the condemnation and
destruction of putrid food by city officials who were acting pursuant to a city
ordinance. 39 The majority reasoned that the owner of the destroyed food
was sufficiently protected because the official who seized the food, in a
subsequent action against him, was required to show as a matter of fact that
such action was within the statute."40 It was not a defense to the wrongful
destruction of property that the city official was acting on the basis of
mistaken facts or proceeded reasonably and in utmost good faith. 141 No
comparable protection exists for public school students who have been
beaten mistakenly because school authorities are now shielded from liability
by a well-established and recognized qualified privilege.
Finally, and most importantly, a tort or criminal action would be
instituted only after the wrong has already occurred and after the child has
suffered physical and psychological pain. Hence, contrary to the majority's
understanding, this solution cannot protect school children from abusive
treatment because any rights or interests the child may possess would only
be recognized and protected after the constitutional deprivation has
occurred. 142
135. Id. at 678 n.46. "The subsequent civil and criminal proceedings available" to
students who are abusively bothered by public school officials, Justice Powell
contended, "may be viewed as affording substantially greater protection to the child
than the informal conference mandated in Goss." Id. Thus, the Court found that the
remedies available to one who has been mistakenly paddled significantly differ from
those available to a student who is wrongfully suspended from school and,
accordingly, Goss and Ingraham are distinguishable.
136. See N. EDWARDS, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 610-15 (3d ed. 1971);
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 27, at 136-37 (4th ed. 1971). See also
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
137. 430 U.S. at 693-96 (White, J., dissenting).
138. 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
139. Id. at 320.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 316.
142. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 695-97 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
Justice White perceives the majority's "novel theory" as devoid of both logic and
precedent: "The logic of this theory would permit a State that punished speeding with
a one-day jail sentence to make a driver serve his sentence first without a trial and
then sue to recover damages for wrongful imprisonment." Id. at 696 (footnote
omitted). See also id. at 696-97 nn.13 & 14. The dissent further reminded the Court
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The sole case cited by the majority in support of its conclusion that a
prior hearing is less compelling where the state provides alternative
remedies is Bonner v. Coughlin.143 In that case, a prisoner sought damages
for the loss of his property due to the negligence of prison officials.144 The
Seventh Circuit concluded that since adequate remedies existed under state
tort law it was unnecessary to provide a federal tort remedy.14 This case is
distinguishable from Ingraham on three separate grounds. First, the
appellant in Bonner did not seek a prior hearing to ensure against an
unwarranted deprivation of a constitutionally protected right; rather, he
sought only compensation for damages already sustained as a result of a
negligent act.146 Because no panoply of due process safeguards would have
protected the appellant against the deprivation he sustained, the only
adequate remedy was to make him whole for the loss he suffered. 147 The
court properly concluded that such relief was available under state law.' 48 In
contrast, the procedural safeguards of prior notice and hearing sought by
the petitioners in Ingraham may have prevented future deprivations of
constitutionally recognized interests. Because state remedies could not
adequately provide such protection, the constitutionally mandated notice
and hearing requirements should have been ordered. Second, unlike the
school officials in Ingraham, the prison officials in Bonner possessed no
qualified immunity in a state negligence suit.' 49 Third, while the deprivation
in Bonner involved the loss of property for which the state could make the
aggrieved plaintiff whole, a student could never be made whole in a state
civil or criminal suit for unjustified or excessive corporal discipline.150
Consequently, in contrast to Bonner, prior procedural safeguards were
necessary in Ingraham in order that such deprivations may be avoided.
The conclusion reached by the Ingraham Court sharply conflicts with
both the spirit and purpose of due process guarantees.' 5' The availability of
that in cases construing the due process clause it has been consistently held that some
kind of hearing is required at some time prior to any deprivation of a protected liberty
or property interest. Id. at 697. Thus, in Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341U.S. 123, 168 (1951), Justice Frankfurter explained that the "right to be heard before
being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve
the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society."(emphasis added). See generally Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578-79 (1975); Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 178- 79 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing cases); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550, 552 (1965).
143. 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), modified, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
144. See id. at 1318.
145. Id. at 1319.
146. Id. at 1318.
147. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 696-97 n.14 (White, J., dissenting).
148. Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1975).
149. 430 U.S. at 696-97 n.14.
150. Referring to the recent case of G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S.
338, 351-59 (1977), Justice White explained that advance procedural safeguards are
more compelling where the government inflicts an injury which cannot be repaired in
a subsequent judicial proceeding (invasion of privacy) than when it inflicts a
temporary injury which can be undone (seizure of property). 430 U.S. .at 696 n.12.
151. "Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake
because of what the government is doing to him," minimal requirements of due
process must be satisfied. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). There
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remedies under state tort or criminal law has been held not to prevent an
aggrieved party from invoking a federal forum to vindicate violation of a
specific constitutional right.152 The implications of such a holding reveal a
threat to these very basic constitutional rights. Under the Court's theory, all
a state need do to avoid federal constitutional adjudication of its action is to
devise a law which provides its potential victims a redress in state court.
Such an approach would seem to conflict with the basic notion that the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land.153 Furthermore, unlike the
situations in the recent cases of Paul v. Davis
5 4 and Bishop v. Wood,155
is nothing contained in this constitutional right which indicates that it is only
applicable where no alternative remedies are available.
152. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Court explicitly rejected the
position it adopted in Ingraham. Referring to a federal statute, Justice Douglas,
speaking for the Court, explained that "[i]t is no answer that the State has a law
which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state
remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is
invoked." Id. at 183. See also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 354-55 (1976) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 714-18 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The fact that a student may have alternative remedies in state court appears
to be a recently recognized factor in determining whether due process safeguards may
be instituted by the federal judiciary. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), the Court
refused to invoke the due process clause to protect persons from torts committed by a
state. Id. at 699-701. Rejecting petitioner's argument that the fourteenth amendment
should provide him a right to be free from any injury wherever the state may be
characterized as a tortfeasor, the Court replied that "such a reading would make of
the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever
systems may already be administered by the States." Id. at 701. See also Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). Furthermore, in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the
Court noted that a federal constitutional cause of action may exist against some
prison officials for acting indifferently to the medical needs of prisoners. Neverthe-
less, the Court held that such an action could not be maintained against prison
physicians for their failure to order additional tests and treatment; at most the
doctors' inaction constituted medical malpractice and the proper forum is state court
under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Id. at 107. But see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 690-91 (1977), where Justice White explained that the Court's holding in Estelle
implicitly furthers the doctrine enunciated in Monroe v. Pape.
153. The deferral of constitutional and other federal matters to state court has been
used increasingly by the Supreme Court in recent years. For a discussion of this
doctrine, see Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REv.
293 (1976).
154. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). In this case, a flyer captioned "Active Shoplifters" and
containing the name and photograph of Edward C. Davis was distributed by the
police to various merchants. Davis brought suit against the police chiefs in the United
States District Court (W.D. Ky.) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) alleging that the actions
of these state officials deprived him of his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court,
in a 5-3 decision (Justice Stevens did not take part), held that reputation alone does
not implicate any "liberty" or "property" interests sufficient to invoke the procedural
protection of the due process clause. 424 U.S. at 701-12. Moreover, something more
than simple defamation must be involved to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
155. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). A former policeman, discharged from his job without a
hearing, brought suit against the City of Marion, North Carolina, the City Manager,
and the Chief of Police, claiming that his constitutional rights, protected by the
fourteenth -amendment, had been violated. The Supreme Court held that neither a
property nor liberty interest had been implicated by the actions of the city officials
and, therefore, no constitutional violation could be found. The federal court is not the
appropriate forum in which to review a public agency's personnel decisions, the Court




excessive corporal punishment implicates specific and important constitu-
tional interests which require the protections guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.15 6 The effect of the Ingraham decision is to recognize a
constitutional liberty interest, but to afford it no practical protection at all.
Although recognizing that implementation of any procedural safe-
guards would interfere, to some extent, with school disciplinary practices,
the Goss Court found that informal due process protections could be
instituted before suspension without unduly burdening the educational
system. 157 By contrast, the Ingraham Court concluded that requiring these
identical informal procedures prior to the infliction of corporal punishment
would impermissibly curtail effective discipline and order in the nation's
public schools. 5 8 However, as Goss illustrates, it would seem that procedural
safeguards could be instituted prior to every infliction of corporal
punishment without destroying this disciplinary technique or unduly
burdening the educational process.5 9 Such informal prerequisites could
easily embody the following features. First, a code of disciplinary practices
should be devised and issued to all students so as to afford them adequate
prior notice that certain behavior would constitute an infraction of school
156. In both Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), and Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976), the Court concluded that the alleged wrong committed by government officials
failed to implicate any specific "liberty" or "property" interest. In contrast, the
Ingraham Court admitted that the infliction of corporal punishment in public schools
involved substantial liberty rights of the child. See note 120 and accompanying text
supra. Thus, the reasoning involved in Paul is inapposite to a situation, similar to
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), where specific constitutional rights are
recognized.
157. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580-81 (1975); note 55 supra.
158. See 430 U.S. at 680-81. Suspension is a sanction infrequently imposed, when
all attempts at reaching the child have failed. Corporal punishment, in contrast, is
administered more often and to a greater number of students. It can be argued that
requiring due process safeguards prior to each paddling would seriously invade the
school disciplinary process, whereas affording a student notice and hearing before an
infrequent suspension would not. The Court emphasized that the hearing requirement
would divert time, personnel, and attention from normal school pursuits. Moreover,
the majority warned that school authorities may avoid the use of corporal
punishment, for less effective measures, rather than be burdened with procedural
requirements. Id.
The mere fact that schools resort to suspension less often than corporal
punishment should not deny those subjected to the latter the protections of the due
process clause. Since this sanction is administered more frequently and to a greater
number of children, the risk of both error and abuse would be higher. Due process
safeguards would protect these children from such consequences. Further, as the
dissent in Ingraham noted, the "significant intrusion" feared by the majority is
exaggerated. 430 U.S. at 700. The principal, or his designee, need only take a few
minutes to explain to the child the charges and evidence against him, and to allow the
student a chance to present his side. There is no requirement under the due process
clause that the student be permitted to secure counsel or call and cross-examine
witnesses. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975). Thus, these constitutional
safeguards are, "'if anything, less than a fair-minded principal would impose upon
himself' in order to avoid injustice." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 700 (footnote
omitted) (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 583). For further discussion of the
informal procedure which could be imposed without unduly burdening the school
disciplinary process, see text accompanying note 14 supra and notes 128 to 133 infra.
159. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580-83 (1975).
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rules and regulations. Second, a student charged with a violation of the code
must be told of what he is being accused and the basis of the accusation. 16°
Third, the offending child must be afforded an opportunity to present his
version of the facts.16 1 If the student protests his innocence, further inquiry
must be pursued in order to prevent unwarranted and mistaken punishment.
Fourth, a neutral person should both decide whether the student is guilty of
the alleged offense and, if the student is guilty, inflict the punishment.
162
Finally, a cooling-off period should be instituted to ensure that the child is
not disciplined in a moment of anger or hostility.163 These procedural
safeguards can be instituted efficiently in an informal manner and with a
minimal expenditure of teacher time and effort.
164
Had the Court declared that summary corporal punishment of public
school students constituted an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty and
prescribed that such procedural safeguards be adhered to before every
infliction of this sanction, potential victims of abusive or unjustified
paddlings would be protected, to some extent, before an injury occurred.165
School officials would also be apprised of the scope of their authority and
disciplinary methods. Accordingly, if the school official thereafter violated
any judicially prescribed procedural safeguard, the child would have the
choice of seeking civil, criminal or constitutional remedies in either state or
federal court. The mere fact that one of these remedies is available in one
forum would not prevent him from seeking relief under another theory in a
different forum.
160. Id. at 582. See also Tate v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 975, 979 (8th Cir. 1972);
Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 603 (D.N.H.), vacated and remanded, 502
F.2d 1159 (1st Cir. 1973).
161. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975). See also Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp.
294 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff'd mem., 423 U.S. 907 (1975). Informal give and take is needed
to assure the preservation of due process protections.
162. This requirement will protect the student from unnecessarily harsh treatment
at the hands of an actual participant in the controversy. Cf. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S.
488, 501 (1974) (need for a separation of factflnder and person preferring charge
recognized).
163. A cooling-off period would reduce the chance of arbitrary and capricious
infliction of corporal discipline. This period need not be of a duration so long as to
weaken the effects of the punishment. Rather, it should last only long enough to
permit tempers to cool so that the student will be dealt with fairly.
164. See note 159 supra.
165. Finding the need for such procedural safeguards prior to imposing a
suspension on a public school student, Justice White, speaking for the Court in Goss,
emphasized the benefits of such protections:
"[F]airness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts
decisive of rights .... " "Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and self-
righteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness. No better instrument
has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious
loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it."
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascists Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951)). "The Clause requires at least these rudimentary
precautions against unfair or mistaken finding of misconduct. Goss v. Lopez,




The Ingraham decision has settled several disputed questions of
constitutional law and has raised numerous new dilemmas. For the first
time in its almost two-hundred-year history, the Supreme Court has
explicitly and unequivocally rejected the notion that the eighth amendment
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment applies to individuals
punished in a civil setting. Only those who are found guilty in a criminal
court of law and who are involuntarily confined to an institution appear
entitled to the protection of this constitutional guarantee. However, the
Court made no attempt to explain where the line limiting eighth amendment
coverage is to be drawn. Thus, the rights of others in institutional settings,
including mental patients, juveniles at state correctional schools, and
retarded children, are left in doubt, to be clarified only by subsequent
Supreme Court decisions. The Ingraham decision may have absolutely no
impact on individuals punished outside the realm of the public school
system, as the Court may later limit its holding to the specific facts of that
case. Only future adjudication will delineate the proper scope of eighth
amendment protection and the true impact of the decision in Ingraham.
Recent decisions have evidenced a weakening of due process coverage,
rights, and guarantees. The Paul and Bishop cases 166 appear to limit the
applicability of the fourteenth amendment to instances where no alternative
remedies in state court are available to afford adequate relief. Mathews v.
Eldridge,167 further provided that, even where specific constitutionally
protected interests are implicated by state action, due process safeguards
may not necessarily be required if the effects of such procedures would
undermine the governmental interest. Ingraham adopts these conclusions
and further establishes this new trend. Consequently, Goss,168 the pinnacle
of the school due process cases, would appear to be drastically diluted. For
the first time since its decision in that case, the Court was asked to extend
those same procedural requirements to another aspect of school discipline.
The Ingraham Court withdrew from this precedent by embracing the
antiquated view that the privileges afforded school officials to deal with
students have supremacy over students' constitutional rights. Unless the
Court limits its holding to the area of corporal punishment, Ingraham could
well presage a complete reversal of the Goss doctrine. The Ingraham holding
thus may signal the beginning of a new era in the constitutional rights of
students. Relying on the policies that underlie the Ingraham decision, the
Court may refuse to intrude into internal school practices in other areas of
student concern, such as censorship of student newspapers and school dress
codes. Children's constitutional rights outside the school environment could
also be severely narrowed. The progeny of this decision will be scrutinized
carefully to determine Ingraham's actual impact and whether a new
constitutional era has actually begun.
166. See text accompanying notes 155 & 156 supra.
167. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
168. See notes 127 to 130 and accompanying text supra.
[VOL. 37
